This paper explores the physical-layer security in a small cell network with cooperative cache-enabled small base stations (SBSs) in the presence of randomly distributed eavesdroppers. We propose a joint design on the caching placement and the physical-layer transmission to improve the secure content delivery probability (SCDP). We first put forward a hybrid caching placement strategy in which a proportion of the cache unit in each SBS is assigned to store the most popular files (MPFs), while the remaining is used to cache the disjoint subfiles (DSFs) of the less popular files in different SBSs as a means to enhance transmission secrecy and content diversity. We then introduce two coordinated multi-point techniques, namely, joint transmission and orthogonal transmission, to deliver the MPFs and DSFs, respectively. We derive analytical expressions for the SCDP in each transmission scheme, considering both non-colluding and colluding eavesdropping scenarios. Based on the obtained analytical results, we jointly design the optimal transmission rates and the optimal caching assignment for maximizing the overall SCDP. Various insights into the optimal transmission and caching designs are further provided. Numerical results are also presented to verify our theoretical findings and to demonstrate the superiority of the proposed caching and transmission strategies.
I. INTRODUCTION
S MALL cell network (SCN) is a promising approach to improving network capacity and achieving seamless wireless coverage in the 5G wireless network. Nevertheless, the increasingly dense deployment of SCNs poses a tremendous challenge to the backhaul links and the backhaul capacity has become the major system bottleneck. To alleviate such bottleneck, wireless caching technique emerges. By pre-storing popular content at the edge of an SCN such as small base stations (SBSs) and reusing the cached content to meet frequent requests from local users, wireless caching is envisioned as an effective solution for relaxing the challenging demand of small cell backhauling and reducing the end-to-end latency [1] .
Wireless caching has a serious security vulnerability as any wireless network due to the broadcast nature of the electromagnetic signal propagation. For example, although wireless caching has a great potential to meet the soaring video-ondemand (VoD) streaming traffic in the 5G network [2] , [3] , the broadcast streaming data by caching nodes are susceptible to potential eavesdroppers such as non-paying subscribers and malicious attackers. It is of great significance to design security-wise caching schemes that can guarantee both data secrecy and quality of service (QoS). Nonetheless, safeguarding the security for a cache-enabled wireless network is confronted with two major challenges. Specifically, the vast majority of current wireless data services still rely on endto-end encryption to ensure data secrecy, e.g., the hypertext transfer protocol secure (HTTPS) applied for video streaming applications such as YouTube and Netflix [4] . However, such encryption schemes might counteract the benefits of wireless caching in terms of high flexibility and large multiplexing gains, since the encrypted content is uniquely defined for each user request and cannot be reused to serve other user requests [5] . Moreover, using the encryption methods will inevitably introduce a large amount of additional operations in the storage, management and distribution of secret keys, thus degrading the efficiency of content placement and delivery. Fortunately, physical-layer security (PLS) [6] , an informationtheoretic approach that has been proven to gain a remarkable secrecy enhancement in various wireless networks [7] - [18] , provides an opportunity to overcome the above limitations. In particular, PLS achieves wireless secrecy by using the wiretap channel encoding instead of the source encryption such that the cached content still can be reused. Moreover, PLS exploits the randomness inherent to the wireless channels without necessarily relying on secret keys. All these advantages make PLS and wireless caching easily integrated in a low-complexity and high-flexibility way.
A. Previous Works
The cache-enabled SCN is first investigated in [19] , where wireless caching has been shown to significantly reduce the average downloading delay. In [2] and [20] , wireless caching has been exploited to improve the energy efficiency of cellular networks. In [21] , a joint caching and buffering strategy has been proposed to overcome the backhaul capacity bottleneck and the half-duplex transmission constraint simultaneously. Considering cooperative transmissions via distributed caching helpers, an optimal caching placement has been designed in [22] as a means to balance the file diversity gain and the cooperation gain. In [23] and [24] , the cacheenabled small cell cooperations in the caching placement (i.e., cache-level cooperation) and in the physical-layer transmission (i.e., signal-level cooperation) have been discussed. In [25] , the cache-and signal-level cooperations have been leveraged under a combined caching placement scheme for improving the cache service performance and the energy efficiency.
Recently, the security issue in the cache-enabled wireless networks has captured a stream of research, motivated by the coded caching scheme introduced in [26] . For instance, a coded caching scheme based on Shannon's one-time pad method has been proposed in [27] for achieving information secrecy against eavesdroppers. This scheme requires a sufficiently large size of random secret keys, but secure sharing of such massive secret keys will cause a considerable system overhead. The scheme in [27] has been extended to the device-to-device networks in [28] , where a sophisticated key generation and encryption scheme has been designed. In [29] and [30] , the security-oriented content placement has been studied based on the maximal distance separable encoding. All these endeavors have dealt with the security issue from an information-theoretic point of view, but few has considered the characteristics of the physical-layer media.
PLS in the cache-enabled wireless networks was not studied until recently. For example, the caching-enabled cooperative multi-input multi-output (MIMO) transmission has been first exploited as an effective physical-layer mechanism to increase the secrecy rate of content delivery, confronting either a single malicious eavesdropper [3] or multiple untrusted cache helpers [31] . Nevertheless, the signaling design therein heavily relies on the estimated instantaneous channel state information (CSI) of the eavesdropper. In practice, it is difficult, if not impossible, to estimate such CSI in real time since the eavesdropper usually listens passively. Dynamically adjusting the transmission parameters will also increase the system complexity and the end-to-end latency. Moreover, the fading feature of the wireless channels and the randomness of eavesdroppers' locations have significant impacts on the security performance, which actually can be exploited to facilitate secure transmissions. However, these aspects have not yet been investigated in [3] and [31] . It is worth mentioning that, there has been substantial research on the PLS in random wireless networks with both channel and location uncertainties [11] - [18] . Stochastic geometry theory has provided a powerful tool to analyze the network security performance by modeling the positions of network nodes (including the eavesdroppers) according to a spatial distribution such as a Poisson point process (PPP) [32] . To the best of our knowledge, the potential of PLS in securing the content delivery for a cache-enabled SCN against randomly distributed eavesdroppers is still elusive, and even a fundamental mathematical framework for security performance analysis and optimization from a stochastic geometry perspective is lacking. This has motivated our work.
B. Our Work and Contributions
In this paper, we explore the potential of the physical-layer secure transmission in conjunction with caching placement in realizing secure content delivery against randomly distributed eavesdroppers. The main contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• We study a combination of the cache-and signal-level cooperations. By the cache-level cooperation, we propose a hybrid caching placement strategy based on file partition, where every SBS assigns a proportion of its cache unit to store the most popular files (MPFs), while using the remaining to cache the disjoint subfiles (DSFs) of the less popular files as a means to improve content diversity and secrecy. By the signal-level cooperation, we put forward two coordinated multi-point (CoMP) techniques, namely, joint transmission (JT) and orthogonal transmission (OT), to deliver the cached MPFs and DSFs, respectively. • We assess the secure content delivery probability (SCDP), which measures the probability that the reliability and secrecy of content delivery can be guaranteed simultaneously. We provide analytical results for the SCDP in each transmission scheme for both non-colluding and colluding wiretap scenarios. We show that the JT scheme outperforms the OT scheme in terms of transmission reliability, whereas the latter provides a higher level of secrecy. • We jointly design the optimal transmission rates and the optimal caching assignment proportion to maximize the overall SCDP under the proposed caching and transmission strategies. The whole maximization procedure is decomposed into two phases. First, the optimal transmission rates that globally maximize the SCDP in the JT and OT schemes are obtained by solving a scalar convex problem and by addressing a vector convex problem through an alternating optimization, respectively; subsequently, the optimal caching assignment proportion that maximizes the overall SCDP is derived in a closed-form expression. Various insights into the optimal results on the transmission and caching strategies are further provided to guide practical designs. 
C. Organization and Notations
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe the system model and the underlying optimization problem. In Section III, we analyze the connection probability and the secrecy probability for both the JT and OT schemes. In Section IV, we design the optimal transmission rates and the optimal caching assignment proportion to maximize the overall SCDP. In Section V, we present numerical results to validate our theoretical analyses. In Section VI, we conclude our work and provide several future research directions.
Notations: Bold lowercase letters denote column vectors. (·) T , | · |, · 1 , · , P{·}, E A [·] denote the operations of transpose, absolute value, L-1 norm, round down, probability and mathematical expectation taken over the random variable (RV) A, respectively. Γ(z) = 
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider security issues in a cache-enabled SCN where a set of K SBSs cooperatively deliver paid content to a subscriber coexisting with randomly located eavesdroppers (e.g., non-paying subscribers), as depicted in Fig. 1 . Let K = [1, · · · , K] denote the index of the SBSs. Each of the SBSs is connected to a central server located at the edge of the core network via wired backhaul links and deploys a cache unit for pre-fetching popular content from the central server during off-peak hours. Once a file requested by a local user is pre-stored in the cache units, i.e., a cache hit event takes place, the file can be delivered to the user by the SBSs directly. Otherwise, a cache miss event is deemed to occur, and the SBSs will fetch the requested file from the central server before conveying it to the user. We assume that all the nodes in the network, including the SBSs, the legitimate users, and the eavesdroppers, each have a single antenna. Besides, only one user can be served in each time slot. The locations of both the SBSs and the legitimate users are deterministic, whereas those of the eavesdroppers are random and unknown. Without loss of generality, we place a typical user at the origin of the polar coordinate and denote the location of the k-th nearest SBS and the location of the j-th nearest eavesdropper to the typical user as {b k : (r b,k , θ b,k )} and {e j : (r e,j , θ e,j )}, with r and θ being the corresponding distance and angle, respectively. Then, the distance between the k-th SBS and the j-th eavesdropper can be calculated as r j,k = r 2 b,k + r 2 e,j − 2r b,k r e,j cos(θ b,k − θ e,j ). Since the eavesdroppers can be randomly distributed over the network, we model their positions as a stationary PPP Φ e on the twodimensional plane R 2 with density λ e , i.e., e j ∈ Φ e [11] - [18] .
To model the wireless channels, including the main channels spanning from the SBSs to the typical user and the wiretap channels spanning from the SBSs to the eavesdroppers, we consider a standard distance-based path loss governed by the exponent α along with Rayleigh fading. Hence, the channel gains from the k-th SBS to the typical user and to the j-th eavesdropper can be expressed as h b,k r −α/2 b,k and h j,k r −α/2 j,k , respectively, where h b,k and h j,k denote the independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) fading coefficients obeying the circularly symmetric complex Gaussian distribution with zero mean and unit variance. We assume that the SBSs are aware of only the statistic CSI (as opposed to the instantaneous) of the main and the wiretap channels. 1
A. Caching Placement Strategy
The central server owns a library of N equal-size files, and the n-th most popular file is denoted as F n . We assume that users make request for files independently with some probabilities according to a commonly adopted popularity pattern, i.e., Zipf distribution [19] . Hence, the request probability for the m-th most popular file can be given by
where γ models the skewness of the popularity profile. In particular, the popularity profile is uniform over files for γ = 0 and becomes more concentrated as γ increases. We consider a finite caching capacity that the K SBSs each can store up to L files and meanwhile the total capacity KL is less than the library size N , i.e., KL < N . To make efficient use of the cache units deployed at the SBSs, we propose a hybrid caching placement strategy to distribute files of different popularities to the SBSs, where each file is partitioned into K equal-size subfiles. To be specific, we divide the cache unit in every SBS into two portions, where a proportion φ of the cache unit is used for storing the most popular files (i.e., MPF caching) and the rest proportion 1 − φ is reserved for caching the disjoint subfiles of the less popular files in different SBSs (i.e., DSF caching). Under such a hybrid caching strategy, file F n with 1 ≤ n ≤ φL belongs to the MPF group in which all the SBSs possess a copy of it; file F n with φL < n ≤ φL + K(L − φL ) belongs to the DSF group where the SBSs each store a unique subfile of it; file F n with n > φL + K(L − φL ) is not cached by the SBSs and only can be fetched from the central server.
It is worth noting that, the DSF caching mode helps to enhance content diversity, i.e., allowing more files to be cached with a finite caching capacity. This can increase the cache hit probability and avoid frequently fetching content from the central server, thus making the communication more efficient. Furthermore, the different subfiles of each file are elaborately encoded such that they only can be decoded in a sequential manner [33] . By doing this, the risk of the entire file being illegally intercepted can be significantly lowered, since it is difficult to decode all the subfiles simultaneously. In other words, content diversity can lift the level of secrecy.
B. Cooperative Transmission Schemes
When the SBSs receive a file request, they determine to adopt different transmission schemes, depending on the popularity of the requested file. We consider two CoMP schemes, namely, JT and OT schemes, which are described as below.
1) Joint Transmission (JT): Let us recall the hybrid caching strategy introduced in the last subsection. When the requested file belongs to the MPF group, the SBSs each have a copy of this file. In order to enhance transmission reliability, the SBSs deliver the same file to the user simultaneously. We refer to this scheme as the JT scheme. 2 The received signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) at the user and at the j-th eavesdropper respectively can be given by
where ρ = P/(W N 0 ) denotes the normalized SNR, with P , W , and N 0 being the SBS transmit power, the total available bandwidth, and the noise spectral density, respectively. We consider identical noise spectral density at all the receivers.
2) Orthogonal Transmission (OT):
When the requested file falls within the DSF group, the SBSs have different subfiles of this file. In order to avert the co-channel interference, the SBSs use orthogonal frequency spectrum to deliver these subfiles, i.e., each SBS occupies 1/K of the overall bandwidth. We name this scheme the OT scheme. For the subfile delivered from the k-th SBS, the received SNRs at the user and at the j-th eavesdropper respectively can be given by
Note that the factor K exists due to a 1/K decrement of the available bandwidth for each SBS.
3) Cache Miss (CM):
When the requested file is not cached by the SBSs, i.e., a cache miss event occurs, all the SBSs first fetch the requested file from the central server and then deliver the same file to the user simultaneously. Hence, the received SNRs at the user and at the j-th eavesdropper share the same expressions as (2) and (3), respectively. For ease of statement, we call this scheme the CM scheme. The wired backhauling process is assumed to be secure, whereas it causes extra delivery delay compared with the cache hit case, which will result in a lower end-to-end rate. This negative impact will be assessed in the subsequent performance analysis and optimization.
C. Performance Metrics
To deliver the content securely, confidential information is encoded with the well-known Wyner's wiretap encoding scheme, where redundant information is intentionally embedded for confusing eavesdroppers [6] . The rates of the transmitted confidential information and redundant information are referred to as the secrecy rate R s and the redundant rate R e , and the wiretap codeword rate is R t = R s + R e . We denote the achievable rates of the main channel and the wiretap channel as C b = log 2 (1 + SNR b ) and C e = log 2 (1 + SNR e ), respectively, with SNR b and SNR e being the corresponding SNRs. 3 If C b is larger than or equal to R t , the legitimate user can recover the confidential information. The probability that this event happens is called the connection probability, which is defined as p c P{C b ≥ R t } [16] . If C e does not exceed R e , no classified information will be leaked to the eavesdropper. The probability that this event occurs is termed the secrecy probability, which is defined as p s P{C e ≤ R e } [16] .
The content delivery is considered secure only if the reliability (connectivity) and the secrecy can be guaranteed simultaneously. In this paper, we employ the metric named SCDP to quantify the likelihood that a secure content delivery event occurs. For a specific transmission scheme S ∈ {JT, OT, CM}, the SCDP is formally defined as the product of the connection probability and the secrecy probability, i.e., P S scd p S c p S s . As a consequence, the overall SCDP under the proposed caching and transmission strategies can be expressed as
where p S tr (φ) denotes the probability of the transmission scheme S ∈ {JT, OT, CM} being adopted for content delivery. In particular, p S tr (φ) can be calculated from (1), i.e.,
We emphasize that the redundant rate R e (for a target secrecy rate R s ) and the caching assignment proportion φ play critical roles in improving the SCDP. Specifically, R e triggers a trade-off between transmission reliability and secrecy. Choosing a larger R e increases the secrecy probability p s but decreases the connection probability p c , since it also increases the wiretap codeword rate R t . Likewise, φ strikes a non-trivial trade-off between transmission reliability, secrecy and content diversity. On one hand, devoting a larger proportion φ for MPFs increases the probability of adopting the JT scheme and thus enhancing transmission reliability. On the other hand, assigning a larger proportion for DSFs (i.e., a smaller φ) increases the probability of using the OT scheme and thus improving transmission secrecy and content diversity. The overall balance of these opposite impacts on the SCDP should be carefully addressed.
In the following sections, we will first derive the connection probability p c and the secrecy probability p s for various transmission schemes. Subsequently, we will design the optimal redundant rate R e and the optimal caching assignment proportion φ to maximize the overall SCDP P scd .
III. CONNECTION AND SECRECY PROBABILITIES ANALYSIS
Since the SCDP is represented as the product of the connection probability p c and the secrecy probability p s , this section will analyze p c and p s for the JT and OT schemes, respectively. The analysis for the CM scheme is similar as that for the JT scheme, and the only difference lies in the backhaul delay caused by the content fetching process in the former. Due to the extra delay, the actual delivery time in the CM scheme reduces. Accordingly, the required secrecy rate increases from R s (for the JT scheme) to δR s , where δ > 1 captures the impact of backhaul delay.
For a fair comparison between the JT and OT schemes, we consider identical target secrecy rate R s in both schemes. In practice, the secrecy rate can correspond to the end-toend rate of a specific service requested by subscribers where its value may be pre-established. Furthermore, due to the simultaneous transmission of a same file in the JT scheme, all the SBSs should set a same wiretap codeword rate R t and a same redundant rate R e , respectively; whereas they can choose different rates in the OT scheme due to the orthogonal transmission of different subfiles. This means, the wiretap codeword rates (also the redundant rates) in the JT and OT schemes are not necessarily the same, and actually their values should be properly designed for maximizing the SCDP, as will be discussed in Sec. IV.
A. Connection Probability 1) JT Scheme: In the JT scheme, the achievable rate of the main channel is
where step (a) follows from the fact that
Since the entire file can be recovered only if all the subfiles have already been decoded, the connection probability is expressed as p OT c = P k∈K SNR b,k ≥ β t,k and can be calculated as
Comparing (9) with (8), we can prove that p JT c ≥ p OT c if the same wiretap codeword rate is used in the JT and OT schemes,
This demonstrates the superiority of the JT scheme in terms of transmission reliability.
B. Secrecy Probability
We consider both non-colluding and colluding eavesdropping (NCE/CE) scenarios. In the NCE case, the eavesdroppers individually decode confidential information, and a secure content delivery can be realized if the achievable rate of the most deteriorate eavesdropper max ej ∈Φe C j does not exceed the redundant rate R e , i.e., max ej ∈Φe C j ≤ R e . In the CE case, the eavesdroppers jointly decode confidential information by superimposing their received signals with the maximal ratio combination (MRC) method. The content can be conveyed secretly if the achievable rate of the equivalent wiretap channel C e does not lie beyond the redundant rate R e , i.e., C e ≤ R e . 1) JT Scheme for NCE Case: In the JT scheme, the achievable rate of the j-th eavesdropper is C j = log 2 (1 + SNR j ) with SNR j given in (3) . Let R e = log 2 (1 + β e ) be the redundant rate with β e 2 Re − 1. Since the eavesdroppers do not collude with each other, the secrecy probability is expressed as p JT s,nce = P max ej ∈Φe SNR j ≤ β e and can be calculated as
where step (b) follows from knowing that k∈K h j,k r −α/2 j,k 2 is an exponential RV with mean k∈K r −α j,k , and step (c) holds by using the probability generating functional (PGFL) over a PPP [39] with r k = r 2 b,k + r 2 − 2r b,k r cos(θ b,k − θ). Although the result in (10) does not appear in a closed form, the integral therein is fairly easy to compute.
2) OT Scheme for NCE Case: In the OT scheme, the achievable rate of the wiretap channel from the k-th SBS to the j-th eavesdropper is C j,k = log 2 (1 + SNR j,k ) with SNR j,k given in (5) . Let R e,k = log 2 (1 + β e,k ) be the redundant rate of the k-th SBS with β e,k 2 R e,k − 1. Given that a file is intercepted only if all its subfiles have been decoded, the secrecy probability for the NCE case can be given by p OT s,nce = P k∈K SNR j,k ≤ β e,k , ∀e j ∈ Φ e and can be calculated as
Comparing (11) with (10), we can prove that p OT s ≥ p JT s if the same redundant rate is employed in the JT and OT schemes, i.e., β e = β e,k for k ∈ K, since we have
This means, the OT scheme provides a higher level of secrecy than does the JT scheme. For the special case with α = 2, we can obtain a more concise expression for p OT s,nce as given below
where
3) JT Scheme for CE Case:
In this scenario, the achievable rate of the equivalent wiretap channel is C e = log 2 1 + ej ∈Φe SNR j with SNR j given in (3) . Let I e ej ∈Φe SNR j . Then, the secrecy probability can be expressed as the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of I e , i.e., p JT s,ce = P {I e ≤ β e }. In order to compute p JT s,ce , we first calculate the Laplace transform of I e .
Lemma 1: The Laplace transform of I e evaluated at value s is given by
where r k shares the same expression as the one in (10) .
Proof: Recalling (3), the Laplace transform L Ie (s) = E Ie e −sIe can be calculated as
where step (d) follows from the independence between channel fading and the PPP such that the expectation over h can be moved into the product; step (e) is obtained by calculating the Laplace transform of the exponential RV k∈K h j,k r −α/2 j,k 2 . Applying the PGFL over a PPP with (14) completes the proof.
It is generally intractable to give a closed form for the exact p JT s,ce . In the following theorem, we resort to a widely used approximation method [34] and derive a closed-form approximation for p JT s,ce . Theorem 1: The secrecy probability in the JT scheme for the CE case satisfies
where ξ M (M !) −1/M , and M is the number of terms used in the approximation. Proof: The secrecy probability p JT s,ce = P {I e ≤ β e } can be calculated as follows,
where the dummy variable ι in step (f) is a normalized gamma RV with the probability density function (PDF) f ι (x) = x M−1 e −x /Γ(M ), and this step follows from the fact that ι converges to identity as M approaches infinity [34] ; step (g) yields an upper bound by invoking Alzer's inequality [35] , i.e., P{ι ≥ z} ≤ 1 − 1 − e −ξz M for a constant z > 0.
Performing the binomial expansion with (16) and using the Laplace transform L Ie (s) = E Ie e −sIe at s = mξ/β e completes the proof. 4) OT Scheme for CE Case: In this situation, the achievable rate of the equivalent wiretap channel from the k-th SBS to the colluding eavesdroppers is C e,k = log 2 1 + ej ∈Φe SNR j,k with SNR j,k given in (5) . The secrecy probability can be interpreted as the complement of the probability that all the subfiles are intercepted by the eavesdroppers, which is expressed as
Since the locations of the SBSs are deterministic, the distances between the j-th eavesdropper and any two SBSs actually are not independent [36] . Hence, the expectation over the PPP Φ e in (17) cannot be put into the product, which makes p OT s,ce difficult to compute. To facilitate the calculation, we first consider a disc B(o, R) centered at the origin o with a radius R and let Φ R e Φ e ∩ B o,R denote the location set of the eavesdroppers residing in the disc B o,R . We then calculate the inner probability in (17) resorting to a common gamma approximation [37] . Specifically, we approximate the term X k = ej ∈Φ R e |h j,k | 2 r −α j,k as a gamma RV, the PDF of which can be given by
The values of υ k and τ k can be obtained by matching the first and second moments of X k , which are given in the following lemma with a detailed proof relegated to Appendix A. Lemma 2: When the positions of the eavesdroppers in the disc B(o, R) are fixed, υ k and τ k in (18) can be given by
For a PPP, the probability of having J eavesdroppers inside the disc B o,R is given by [39] 
Hence, the secrecy probability in (17) can be rewritten as
and the exact value is provided by the following theorem. Theorem 2: The secrecy probability in the OT scheme for the CE case is given by
where υ k and τ k are given in (19) . Proof: Recalling the PDF of X k shown in (18) , the inner probability in (21) can be given by
Conditioned on having J eavesdroppers in the disc B o,R , the distribution of the eavesdroppers' locations follows a binomial point process (BPP). Using the i.i.d. property of a BPP, the joint PDF of the distances r k = [r 1,k , · · · , r J,k ] T and angles θ k = [θ 1,k , · · · , θ J,k ] T is characterized by
Substituting (20), (23) , and (24) into (21) completes the proof. Although Theorem 2 does not give a closed-form expression for the secrecy probability, it yields a general exact result without requiring time-consuming Monte Carlo simulations. Furthermore, Theorem 2 provides a benchmark for comparison with other approximate results.
If the distance between adjacent SBSs becomes large enough, the correlation of the distances between an eavesdropper and any two SBSs would vanish due to the random mobility of the eavesdroppers. In other words, the eavesdroppers' positions seen from different SBSs can be regarded as independent PPPs Φ e,k with the same density λ e . In this case, the secrecy probability in (17) can be recast as
wherer j,k denotes the distance between the j-th eavesdropper and the k-th SBS after shifting the coordinate system with the k-th SBS positioned at the origin. Note thatr j,k should be distinguished from r j,k given in (17) . Since the expectation over Φ e,k is placed into the product in (25) , the computation is greatly simplified. Let I k = Kρ ej ∈Φ e,k |h j,k | 2r−α j,k , and the Laplace transform of I k is given in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 [32, Eqn. (8) ]: Let κ πΓ(1 + 2/α)Γ(1 − 2/α). The Laplace transform of I k is given by
Similar to Theorem 1, a closed-form expression for an upper bound of p OT s,ce is provided by the following theorem. Theorem 3: The secrecy probability in the OT scheme for the CE case satisfies
where ξ and M have been stated in Theorem 1.
For the special case with α = 4, we can further derive a closed-form expression for the exact p OT s,ce . The PDF of I k can be first obtained from the inverse Laplace transform of L I k (s),
Plugging (28) 
where step (h) follows from the substitution κ 2 λ 2 e Kρ/(4x) → t 2 . Since the error function erf(z) is an increasing function of z, it is apparent that p OT s,ce increases with the number of SBSs K and the redundant rate R e , and decreases with the density of eavesdroppers λ e and the normalized SNR ρ.
IV. SECURE CONTENT DELIVERY PROBABILITY MAXIMIZATION
In this section, we jointly design the optimal redundant rate R e and the optimal caching assignment proportion φ to maximize the overall SCDP P scd . From the definition of P scd given in (6), we observe that the problem of maximizing P scd can be decomposed into two steps: 1) determining the optimal R e to maximize the SCDP P S scd = p S c p S s for each scheme S ∈ {JT, OT, CM}; 2) designing the optimal φ to maximize the overall SCDP P scd . In what follows, we perform the optimization procedure step by step.
A. Optimization of Redundant Rate R e
This subsection devises the optimal redundant rate R e for a fixed secrecy rate R s to maximize the SCDP for scheme S ∈ {JT, OT, CM}. For mathematical tractability, we focus on the NCE case. The optimization for the CE case can be operated similarly, which however would result in a considerable calculation complexity and a much more sophisticated analysis but provide no significant qualitative difference. 
The solution to problem (32) is given in the following theorem. Theorem 4: Q(β e ) in (32) is a convex function of β e , and the optimal β e that minimizes Q(β e ) is characterized by
i.e., it is the unique zero-crossing of the following derivative,
Proof: Please refer to Appendix B. Appendix B shows that dQ(β e )/dβ e increases from negative to positive as β e increases from zero to infinity. Hence, the value of β e can be efficiently obtained via a bisection search with equation (33) . The following corollary develops quite a few insights into the behavior of β e . Corollary 1: The optimal β e that maximizes P JT scd increases with the eavesdropper density λ e , and decreases with the secrecy rate R s and the SBS-user distance r b,k for k ∈ K.
Proof: Let us take λ e as an example. Denote dQ(β e )/dβ e in (34) as Q 1 (β e ) such that Q 1 (β e ) = 0. Using the derivative rule for implicit functions [13] with Q 1 (β e ) = 0 yields,
This means β e increases with λ e . The other properties on β e can be concluded in a similar way.
Corollary 1 captures an inherent trade-off between transmission reliability and secrecy. It further suggests that we should choose a large redundant rate for densely distributed eavesdroppers, whereas we should keep redundant rate low for a large target secrecy rate or for a remote user.
2) OT Scheme: The SCDP in the OT scheme can be obtained by computing the product of the connection probability p OT c in (9) and the secrecy probability p OT s in (11), as given below,
Compared with the JT scheme, the SBSs in the OT scheme can use different redundant rates for maximizing the SCDP. We assume that the knowledge of the SBS-user distances is available at the SBSs, and hence it can be exploited to devise the optimal redundant rates at different SBSs. In order to jointly design the redundant rates R e,k for k ∈ K, we recast (36) into a vector form, i.e., P OT scd = e − βs Kρ r b 1 e −Ω(βe) , where the auxiliary function Ω(β e ) is given as below,
Kρ r T e βe rdrdθ, (37) with r b = [r α b,1 , · · · , r α b,K ] T ≥ 0, r e = [r α 1 , · · · , r α K ] T ≥ 0, and β e = [β e,1 , · · · , β e,K ] T ≥ 0. Apparently, to maximize P OT scd we only need to tackle the following problem,
We point out that the objective function Ω(β e ) in (37) is strictly convex on β e due to the summation of an affine function and an integral with exponential terms. Generally, problem (38) can be numerically resolved using some gradient methods, e.g., Newton's method [41] . However, the Newton's method involves forming and storing the Hessian matrix repeatedly, and the computation of the Newton step requires solving a set of linear equations. All these operations will bring the system a huge calculation burden and thus resulting in a poor system efficiency, particularly when the number of SBSs K goes large enough. For the sake of a low computational complexity, we propose to process problem (38) through an alternating optimization (AO), as described below. Denote β
as the AO iterate at the n-th iteration, and e,k . We solve the following K subproblems alternatively to obtain β (n) e,1 , · · · , β (n) e,K for n = 1, 2, · · · β (n) e,k = arg min
Lemma 4: When the values of β e,j for j = k are fixed, the solution to problem (39) is given by
where β • e,k is the unique zero-crossing of the derivative given below, dQ β (n) e,k , β e,k dβ e,k
Proof: Since Q β (n) e,k , β e,k in (37) is a convex function of β e,k , it arrives at the minimal value at β e,k = 0 if dQ β (n) e,k , β e,k /dβ e,k | β e,k =0 ≥ 0, or at the zero-crossing of dQ β (n) e,k , β e,k /dβ e,k otherwise. The value of β • e,k can be efficiently calculated through a bisection search with the equation dQ β (n) e,k , β • e,k /dβ • e,k = 0. Lemma 4 suggests that the remote SBS, e.g., with a large distance r b,k such that dQ β (n) e,k , β e,k /dβ e,k | β e,k =0 ≥ 0, should set zero redundant rate. With Lemma 4, we summarize the whole AO process in Algorithm 1. Notably, the proposed AO iterative algorithm produces descending objective values, i.e., Ω β (n) e < Ω β (n−1) e , · · · , < Ω β (0) e . More importantly, it has a theoretically provable guarantee on the global optimality of our solution and the convergence.
Proposition 1: Every limit point β e of the iterates β (n) e generated by the AO process shown in (39) is a Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) point of the primal problem (38) .
Proof: Since the objective function Ω(β e ) in (38) is a strictly convex function of β e , the KKT conditions are necessary and sufficient for the solution to problem (38) [41] :
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier introduced for the inequality constraints given in (38) . Since λ acts as a slack variable in (42a), it actually can be eliminated, leaving 
Evidently, (44) gives the KKT conditions for the k-th subproblem (39) . The combination of the KKT conditions for the K subproblems is exactly the KKT conditions for problem (38) . This completes the proof. For a simplified case where all the SBSs employ the same redundant rate R e , a more computational-convenient solution to problem (38) can be provided by the following theorem.
Theorem 5: If all the SBSs use the same redundant rate R e , the optimal β e that minimizes Q (β e ) in (38) is the unique zero-crossing of the derivative dQ (β e )/dβ e given below, 
The value of β e can be efficiently calculated via a bisection search with equation dQ (β e )/dβ e = 0. We can develop some insights into the optimal β e that are similar to Corollary 1.
3) CM Scheme: The SCDP in the CM scheme has the same expression as the one in the JT scheme, only with R s increasing to δR s . Therefore, the optimal β e that maximizes the SCDP in the CM scheme shares the same form as given in Theorem 4, simply by replacing β s with 2 δRs − 1.
B. Optimization of Caching Assignment Proportion φ
This subsection determines the optimal caching assignment proportion φ that maximizes the overall SCDP P scd in (6) with p S tr for S ∈ {JT, OT, CM} given in (7a) and (7b). Note that the summation of discrete sequence aroused by p S tr hampers the optimization of the overall SCDP. Fortunately, the sum of the Zipf probabilities can be approximated as [38] M n=1
Invoking (46) with (7a) and (7b) and plugging the obtained results into (6) with the integer φL replaced with the continuous quantity φL, P scd can be simplified as a continuous function of φ,
whereP jo = P JT scd − P OT scd ,P oc = P OT scd − P CM scd , andP jc = P JT scd −P CM scd denote the SCDP differences, with P S scd being the SCDP for the scheme S ∈ {JT, OT, CM}. Before proceeding to derive the optimal φ that maximizes P scd , we give the following lemma.
Lemma 5: The JT scheme provides a larger SCDP than does the CM scheme, i.e., P JT scd > P CM scd . Proof: Note that P CM scd shares the same expression as P JT scd in (30) only with β s increasing from 2 Rs − 1 to 2 δRs − 1.
Hence, the proof is equivalent to proving that the maximal P JT scd with the optimal β e given in Theorem 4 decreases with β s . By re-expressing P JT scd = e −W (βs) where W (β s ) = Aβ s + Q(β e (β s )) with A and Q(β e (β s )) given in (31) , we only need to prove that W (β s ) is an increasing function of β s . The derivative dW (β s )/dβ s is given by
From (33) we know that dQ(β e )/dβ e = 0. Then, we have dW (β s )/dβ s > 0, and this completes the proof. Theorem 6: With the proposed hybrid caching placement strategy, the optimal proportion φ that maximizes P scd in (47) is given by
Proof: Please refer to Appendix C. Theorem 6 shows that the SCDP difference between different transmission schemes is critical to the optimal caching assignment. Specifically, when P CM scd exceeds P OT scd or when P JT scd − P OT scd is K − 1 times larger than P OT scd − P CM scd , we have φ = 1, meaning that caching the MPFs is more conductive. As P OT scd increases, the optimal φ becomes smaller, i.e., a larger proportion of the cache unit should be assigned for the DSFs. We also can prove that the optimal φ increases with the content popularity skewness γ. The reason behind is that, as the content popularity becomes more concentrated (i.e., a larger γ), the benefit of caching different files becomes limited.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present simulation results to validate our theoretical analysis. For simplicity, we consider a twodimensional system model as illustrated in Fig. 2 . Without loss of generality, we set a reference distance d 0 = 100 m and a reference density λ 0 = 10 −6 nodes/m 2 . Unless specified otherwise, we fix the normalized SNR ρ = P/(W N 0 ) = 10 dB, the path-loss exponent α = 4, the distance between any two adjacent SBSs D = d 0 , the content library size N = 100, and the SBS caching capacity L = 20. Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 depict the secrecy probabilities p s versus the redundant rates R e for the NCE and CE cases, respectively. The Monte-Carlo simulation results match well with the theoretical values. Both figures verify the superiority of the OT scheme over the JT scheme in terms of transmission secrecy. As expected, the secrecy probability increases with R e and Fig. 4 shows that the approximate results given in (15) and (27) coincide well with the real ones when M = 5. We also find that the results in (29) approach the simulated ones in (22) , particularly for a large distance D, e.g., D = 6d 0 . This is because, for a sufficiently large D, the correlation in the distances between an eavesdropper and any two SBSs becomes negligible. Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 plot the SCDP P S scd as a function of the redundant rate R e in the JT and OT schemes, respectively. Fig. 5 shows that the SCDP P JT scd in the JT scheme first increases and then decreases with R e , just as proved in Theorem 4. We also observe that the optimal R e that maximizes P JT scd increases with a larger λ e or a smaller R s , verifying the insights extracted in Corollary 1. Fig. 6 shows how the SCDP P OT scd in the OT scheme varies with the redundant rates R e,k at different SBSs when the user is located differently. Sub-figures (a) to (d) reveal that P OT scd is dominated by the redundant rate at the closer SBS to the user. This suggests that, in order to improve the SCDP, we should set zero redundant rate at those remote SBSs and should modestly choose the redundant rates at those neighboring SBSs, just as indicated in Lemma 4. Fig. 7 illustrates how the SCDP is affected by the geographical relationship between the user and the SBSs in various transmission schemes. With the experimental model described in Fig. 2 in mind, we find that in the JT scheme, if only the user moves close to one of the SBSs, the SCDP can be remarkably improved. Whereas in the OT scheme, only if the user is located approximately at the center of the SBSs, or there is no significant difference among the distances between the user and different SBSs, a high SCDP can be achieved; otherwise the SCDP performance is severely degraded. In addition, Fig. 7 shows that the JT scheme outperforms the CM scheme, just as proved in Lemma 5. However, whether the JT or the OT scheme is superior depends on the specific transmission environment. For instance, as shown in Fig. 7 , in a sparse eavesdropper scenario, the JT scheme reaps more fruits than does the OT scheme; whereas in a dense eavesdropper case and meanwhile the user is located near the SBSs, the OT scheme provides a higher benefit for secure content delivery. Fig. 8 shows how the optimal caching placement is influenced by the user's location and the eavesdropper density. When the eavesdroppers are distributed sparsely (a small λ e ), or when the user is located far away from the SBSs, the SCDP is bottlenecked by the connection probability. This suggests that the SBSs should adopt the JT scheme to improve transmission reliability. Hence, the optimal φ goes to one, meaning that caching the MPFs is more rewarding. When the eavesdropper density λ e increases, or the user moves close to the SBSs, the secrecy probability becomes the major bottleneck for improving the SCDP. In order to guarantee a certain level of secrecy, the OT scheme becomes preferred. Hence, the optimal φ approaches zero, suggesting that the SBSs should store the DSFs geographically. For a moderate density of eavesdroppers or SBS-user distance, the optimal φ lies between zero and one, showing that there exists a trade-off between caching the MPFs and the DSFs. We also find that the optimal φ increases with the content popularity skewness γ, which coincides with the finding given in Theorem 6. Fig. 9 depicts the optimal caching proportion φ versus the target secrecy rate R s . The Monte-Carlo simulated results match well with the theoretical values, verifying the accuracy of the approximation given in (47). We show that φ initially is small at the small R s region and then increases with R s . This is because, to support a large R s , transmission reliability should be adequately ensured and thus the JT scheme becomes favorable. We also observe that φ increases with the number of SBSs K. This means, with more cooperative SBSs, the benefit from caching the MPFs along with the JT scheme would be more pronounced. Fig. 10 compares the overall SCDPs for different caching strategies. We show that the proposed hybrid caching strategy outperforms either the MPF-only or the DSF-only scheme. In particular, hybrid caching can provide a remarkable performance gain over the MPF-only caching for a small secrecy rate R s and a large eavesdropper density λ e , or over the DSF-only caching for a large R s and a small λ e . In addition, the SCDP performance without caching severely deteriorates.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper studies the security issue in a cache-enabled cooperative SCN against randomly located eavesdroppers. We propose a hybrid MPF and DSF caching strategy along with the JT and OT schemes. We derive analytical expressions for the SCDP in each transmission scheme for both NCE and CE scenarios, based on which the optimal transmission rates and the optimal caching assignment are jointly designed for maximizing the overall SCDP. We also develop various insights into the optimal designs. Numerical results demonstrate the superiority of the proposed hybrid caching strategy over the MPF-and DSF-only ones in terms of the SCDP. This paper opens up several interesting research directions. For example, the proposed analysis and design framework can be extended to investigate the cooperative multi-antenna SBSs in cache-enabled SCNs, where artificial jamming signals can be exploited to confound eavesdroppers. The potential of PLS can be further tapped by performing adaptive designs leveraging the instantaneous CSI of the main channels. Studying the secure content delivery from a network perspective, e.g., considering a multi-cell cellular network, is also an interesting issue. Nevertheless, this might be much more sophisticated, since we should analyze the influence of both random interferers and eavesdroppers. Another possible direction is to consider diverse secrecy attributes for different files, and to explore more intelligent caching strategies.
APPENDIX

A. Proof of Lemma 2
The i-th cumulant of the RV X k is defined as
The mean and variance of X k are μ X k = Q (1)
. Hence, the parameters υ k and τ k in (18) can be calculated as υ k = μ 2 X k /σ 2 X k and τ k = σ 2 X k /μ X k . Recall that X k = ej ∈Φ R e |h j,k | 2 r −α j,k . Due to the mutual independence among {h j,k } for e j ∈ Φ R e , we can express E X k e ωX k for a fixed Φ R e as follows,
Denote g j,k (ω) = E h j,k e −ω|h j,k | 2 r −α j,k such that E X k e ωX k = ej ∈Φ R e g j,k (ω) and Q (i) X k = d i g j,k (ω)/dω i | ω=0 . Then, we have g j,k (ω)| ω=0 = 1, (dg j,k (ω)/dω) | ω=0 = r −α j,k , and d 2 g j,k (ω)/dω 2 | ω=0 = 2r −2α j,k . Based on these results, the first and second cumulants of X k respectively can be calculated as 
After some algebraic manipulations, we can obtain μ X k = ej ∈Φ R e r −α j,k and σ 2 X k = ej ∈Φ R e r −2α j,k , and substituting them into the expressions of υ k and τ k completes the proof.
B. Proof of Theorem 4
Recall (34), and the second derivative d 2 Q(β e )/dβ 2 e can be given by This means that Q(β e ) is strictly convex on β e . Next, we determine the signs of dQ(β e )/dβ e at β e → ∞ and β e = 0. We can prove that (dQ(β e )/dβ e ) | βe→∞ = A(1 + β s ) > 0 from (34) , and (dQ(β e )/dβ e ) | βe=0 < 0 by realizing that P scd | βe=0 = 0 and P scd | βe>0 > 0 from (30), respectively. Since dQ(β e )/dβ e increases with β e , there exists a unique β e that satisfies dQ(β e )/dβ e = 0, which is the solution to (32) .
C. Proof of Theorem 6
Recall (47), and the first and second derivatives of P scd respectively can be given by
where Δ L γ−1 N 1−γ − 1 /(1 − γ) > 0. Since P JT scd > P CM scd always holds, we can determine the optimal φ that maximizes P scd by distinguishing three cases: 1) If P OT scd < P CM scd , we have dP scd /dφ > 0, i.e., P scd monotonically increases with φ. Hence, P scd reaches the maximal value at φ = 1; 2) If P OT scd > P JT scd , we have dP scd /dφ < 0, i.e., P scd monotonically decreases with φ. Then, the maximal P scd is achieved at φ = 0; 3) If P JT scd ≥ P OT scd ≥ P CM scd , we have d 2 P scd /dφ 2 < 0, i.e., P scd is concave on φ. Since (dP scd /dφ) | φ=0 > 0, P scd arrives at the maximal value at φ = 1 if (dP scd /dφ) | φ=1 > 0 or otherwise at the zero-crossing of the derivative dP scd /dφ. By now, we have completed the proof.
